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INTRODUCTION
"The victim has informed us ... that she does not want to proceed
with this trial. For this reason, and this reason alone, the case is being
dismissed," announced the prosecutor of the Kobe Bryant rape case.'
t © by Rachel A. Van Cleave, 2007. All rights reserved.
* Rachel A. Van Cleave, Professor of Law, Golden Gate University School of Law. In
1996 the author was a Fulbright Research Scholar and engaged in comparative crimi-
nal justice research at the Italian Constitutional Court in Rome, Italy. She returned
to Italy during a Faculty Development Leave in 2003 to research the history of vio-
lence against women in Italy. This research was also supported by a Gloria Lyerla
Memorial Research Travel Grant at Texas Tech University School of Law. The au-
thor is indebted to the director and staff of the library of the Corte Cassazione in
Rome, Italy for their patient assistance with this research. The author also thanks the
faculty at the University of California, Hastings College of Law, where she was a Vis-
iting Professor of Law from 2005-06, for the opportunity to present this research at a
faculty colloquium and for their -houghtful comments and questions. The author
thanks Ugo Mattei for insightful suggestions on an earlier draft. Unless otherwise
noted, translations from Italian sources were done by the author.
1. Steve Henson, Bryant and His Accuser Settle Civil Assault Case, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3,
2005, at Al (setting out chronology of the criminal and civil cases against Bryant).
After the court reporter mistakenly sent transcripts of the criminal proceedings to
seven media entities, the Colorado Supreme Court issued an opinion about the me-
dia's right to publish material from in camera proceedings regarding the accuser's
prior or subsequent sexual conduct. People v. Bryant, 94 P.3d 624, 631-32 (Colo.
2004) (holding that the District Court's order prohibiting media entities from publish-
ing the contents of these transcripts is a narrowly tailored, and therefore constitutional,
prior restraint), stay denied, AP v. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 1301 (2004). The consideration
of the accuser's sexual history led victim's advocates to propose legislation that would
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Certainly, the prosecutor was not required to drop the charges; the state
could have pursued the case, subpoenaed the victim and then made a
motion to treat her as a hostile witness during questioning at trial. How-
ever, as a practical matter, it is difficult to secure a conviction, especially
a rape conviction, with a reluctant and uncooperative complaining wit-
ness. If this case had occurred in Italy, once the victim requested
prosecution, she would not be able to change her mind.2 In addition,
even if a victim is later reluctant about pursuing rape charges, the state
must proceed with prosecution.
Italian law requires rape victims to make a formal request that the
state prosecute the alleged rapist. This request is called a querela and
without such a request prosecution does not proceed, though there are
some exceptions. In addition, the request for prosecution is irrevocable;
the victim cannot withdraw her request for prosecution. Italian law has
included the querela requirement for over one hundred years. It was in-
cluded in the Zanardelli Code of 1889,' the first Penal Code of unified
Italy, maintained in the Rocco Code of 1930,4 the Penal Code of Fascist
Italy, and-after a great deal of controversy-the querela survived the
1996 reform of Italy's rape law.5 Rape is the only violent crime for which
a querela is required under Italian law.6 The drafters of the 1996 reform
law justified maintaining the querela requirement for rape to ensure that
a victim of rape is able to control the decision of whether to subject her-
self to a public trial.
This Essay describes the history of the querela in Italy and explores
the controversy surrounding the decision to maintain this institution. In
strengthen Colorado's rape-shield law. Douglas Quan, Two-year Ordeal Ends for Bry-
ant, Accuser, PREsS ENTERPRISE, Mar. 3, 2005, at Al. See also CoLo. REV. STAT. § 18-
3-407 (2005), adding a subsection to allow a court to issue a protective order prohib-
iting disclosure of information about a witness or victim in criminal cases specified in
the statute.
2. I recognize that both men and women are victims of rape. However, since the vast
majority of rape victims are women I have opted to use the feminine pronoun. See
ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RAPE AND THE CULTURE OF THE COURTROOM Xi (1999) ("Be-
cause rape victims are predominantly women, and rapists are usually men, my
pronoun usage reflects that reality."); Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1089,
n. 1 (1986) (recognizing that men as well as women are victims of rape).
3. CODICE PENALE [C.P. (1889)] art. 336 (1889)(It.) reprinted in I REATI SESSUALI 312
(Franco Coppi ed., 2000).
4. CODICE PENALE [C.p. (1930)] art. 542 (1930) (It.); For the only English translation
of the 1930 Italian Penal Code, see THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL
CODES: ITALIAN PENAL CODE (Edward M. Wise, trans., Fred B. Rothman & Co.
1978).
5. Le Leggi, Feb. 15, 1996, n.66, art. 8 reprinted in I REATI SESSUALI 323 (Franco
Coppi ed., 2000); CODICE PENALE [C.P.] art. 609.
6. TAMAR PITCH, UN DIRITTO PER DUE 154 (1998).
[Vol. 13:273
RAPE AND THE QUERELA IN ITALY
addition, this Essay questions the degree to which the querela can pro-
tect victim agency when the attitudes of judges and lawyers in the Italian
criminal justice system reflect persistent rape myths.
Part I describes the querela and its role in Italy's criminal justice sys-
tem. This section includes some introductory information on the Italian
criminal justice system to put the role of the querela into context. Part II
explores the history of this institution in the context of rape laws preced-
ing the 1996 reform, and how this history shaped the debate
surrounding the 1996 law. Part III describes the changes implemented
by the 1996 law, and under what circumstances the new law requires
prosecution by querela. Part IV examines scholarly discussions of victim
agency in the United States in the context of mandatory policies for ad-
dressing domestic violence. This section compares the notion of victim
agency propounded by those in favor of maintaining the querela re-
quirement with definitions of victim agency explored by United States
scholars in the context of domestic violence. Such a comparison reveals
that the definition of agency relied on by those who argued in favor of
maintaining the querela is too narrow for this device to serve as an effec-
tive protection for rape victims. Finally, Part V of this Essay concludes
that the history of the querela and its current structure belie the argu-
ment that it can protect victim agency. This Essay recommends that
feminist law reformers and anti-violence advocates in Italy focus on ways
to educate police, judges, public prosecutors and others about rape, as
well as endeavor to dispel persistent rape myths and expand the meaning
of agency beyond the mere issue of victim "choice."
I. CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN ITALY AND THE QUERELA
Unlike the pubblico ministero in Italy, and analogous officials in
other countries with civil law roots, a prosecutor in the United States
has a great deal of discretion to decide whether to institute criminal pro-
ceedings.' One important factor the United States prosecutor weighs is
the likelihood that she will obtain a conviction against the defendant!
7. See William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States: The
Limits of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1325, 1337 (1993) (also discussing indirect constraints on the discretion of U.S.
prosecutors).
8. Mirjan Damaika, Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure, 84
YALE L.J. 480, 519 n.102 (1975). See also Carrie A. Moser, Penalties, Fouls, and Er-
rors: Professional Athletes and Violence Against Women, II SPORTS LAw. J. 69, 78
20071
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By contrast, the Italian Constitution provides for mandatory prosecu-
tion.9 This constitutional provision requires the pubblico ministero to
institute criminal proceedings upon receiving notice of a crime. Such
notice may come from the police, other public officials, or private indi-
viduals who have knowledge that a crime has occurred. As to most
offenses, and almost all violent offenses, prosecution proceeds automati-
cally, or d'ufficio; that is, once the pubblico ministero receives notice of a
crime, the prosecution of that crime begins automatically. However, as
to some offenses, including rape, prosecution does not begin unless and
until the victim presents a querela, a formal request for prosecution.
There is no exact parallel to the querela in the U.S. system of jus-
tice. Querela has been translated as "private prosecution' 0 and as "right
of complaint."" Since neither of these translations adequately captures
the fact that prosecution can not proceed without a querela, I have de-
cided to use the Italian word. Both the Italian Code of Criminal
Procedure and the Penal Code include provisions regarding the querela.2
The criminal procedure code speaks of the querela as an expression of
the victim's wish that the offender be prosecuted. The Penal Code de-
scribes the querela as a right of the victim to call for prosecution of
offenses not requiring automatic prosecution. 3 Thus, a querela allows
prosecution to proceed while also asking that criminal law be applied to
the offender. 4
Since the querela gives the victim control over the decision to
prosecute, it is inconsistent with the hierarchical structure of authority
first described by Mirjan Damagka. 5 One central aspect of a hierarchical
model of criminal justice is official control over the investigatory and
trial phases of a criminal inquiry.6 This model helps to explain the rela-
tive lack of prosecutorial discretion, as well as the reluctance to allow lay
judges to decide guilt or innocence. The history of Italy's criminal justice
system is generally consistent with a hierarchical model. However, in
1989, Italy adopted a major reform implementing an adversarial trial
system. This change was designed to take substantial authority and con-
(2004) (discussing prosecutors' reluctance to pursue rape charges against professional
athletes unless the case is "ironclad").
9. Costituzione della Repubblica [COST. 1948] [Constitution] (1948) art. 112.
10. FRANCESCO DE FRANCHIS, DIZIONARIo GIURIDICO: ITALIANO-INGLESE 1171 (1996).
11. C.p. (1930) arts. 120, 126.
12. CODICE DI PROCEDURA PENALE [C.P.P.] art. 336 (It.); C.P. art. 120.
13. C.p. art. 120.
14. ARTURO SANTORO, NovIssIMo DIGESTO ITALIANO 640-59 (1968).
15. See Dama~ka, supra note 8, at 485-86 (describing the "ideal of official decisionmak-
ing" in the hierarchical model).
16. Id. at 491 (describing how lay participation conflicts with this hierarchical ideal).
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trol over criminal investigations and trials away from the investigative
magistrate and place more decisions in the hands of the pubblico minis-
tero and defense attorney.1 7 Nonetheless, the querela existed long before
these changes and may thus be viewed as somewhat aberrational. In-
deed, there is no principle that determines whether an offense requires a
querela.
The querela is a tool used to achieve a number of different goals.
For example, pursuant to a 1981 law,'8 the Italian legislature altered a
number of offenses to impose a querela requirement. The purpose of the
law was to unclog the criminal justice system and to respond to criti-
cisms of the number of amnesties granted when prisons were
overcrowded or the backlog of cases was too great. 9 As to offenses in-
volving the falsification of a private document, 0 misuse of a document
signed in blank," use of false documents,22 or the suppression, destruc-
tion and concealment of genuine documents,23 the 1981 law added an
article stating that these offenses are prosecuted by querela unless the
relevant document is a holographic will.24 The 1981 law also imposed a
querela requirement for the prosecution of certain property offenses.25
The crimes of taking jointly owned property,26 usurpation, 27 diversion of
water and changing the condition of sites28 were all amended to require
a querela before prosecution may proceed.
17. For detailed descriptions and analyses, in English, of Italy's 1989 Code of Criminal
Procedure, see Michele Panzavolta, Reforms and Counter-Reforms in the Italian Struggle
for and Accusatorial Criminal Law System, 30 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 577
(2005); William T. Pizzi & Mariangela Montagna, The Battle to Establish an Adver-
sarial Trial System in Italy, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 429 (2004); Elisabetta Grande,
Italian Criminal Justice: Borrowing and Resistance, 48 AM. J. CoMp. L. 227 (2000);
Rachel A. Van Cleave, An Offer You Can't Refuse? Punishment without Trial in Italy
and the United States: The Search for Truth and an Efficient Criminal Justice System, 11
EMORY INT'L L. REv. 419 (1997); William T. Pizzi & Luca Marafioti, The New Ital-
ian Code of Criminal Procedure: The Difficulties of Building an Adversarial Trial System
on a Civil Law Foundation, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (1992).
18. Le Leggi, Nov. 24, 1981, n.689.
19. Van Cleave, supra note 17, at 442; Pizzi & Marafioti, The New Italian Code of
Criminal Procedure, supra note 17, at 6.
20. C.P. art. 485.
21. C.. art. 486.
22. C.r. arts. 488, 489.
23. C.I. art. 490.
24. C.r. art. 493 bis.
25. Id.; Le Leggi, supra note 18.
26. C.i. art. 627.
27. C.i. art. 631.
28. C.,. art. 632.
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Although the 1981 law imposed a querela requirement, exceptions
were made where certain aggravating circumstances were present. For ex-
ample, as to the crime of introducing or abandoning animals on another's
land and wrongful pasturage,29 the 1981 law added a paragraph requiring
a querela, with exceptions for situations involving public waters, lands,
resources or buildings, or any such spaces designated for public use.30 A
querela requirement was added to the crime of fraud,3' unless certain ag-
gravating circumstances are present. 2 The querela was not the only tool
relied on by the 1981 law; this law also decriminalized some offenses, de-
creased the penalty for other offenses, and implemented a limited form of
resolution of criminal charges without trial to allow for resolution of cer-
tain offenses without a full trial 3
Somewhat similarly, the querela is used as a compromise for of-
fenses that have minimal public interest, but the state will nonetheless
prosecute if the injured party requests prosecution. These offenses in-
clude so-called delitti contro l'onore, or crimes against one's honor, such
as ingiuria, or insult,34 and diffamazione, or defamation.35 The main rea-
son for the querela requirement is that such offenses are private in
nature, because they harm only an individual, thus the public interest in
prosecuting such crimes is tenuous and prosecution should occur only if
the person harmed so wishes. 6
The general provisions regarding the querela state that where the
victim is under the age of fourteen, or is mentally infirm, the right of
querela "shall be exercised by a parent or guardian., 37 The right of
querela "may not be exercised more than three months from the date on
which the victim had notice of the facts which constitute the offense."3 8
A querela may be presented to a pubblico ministero or an officer of the
polizia giudiziaria, best translated as criminal investigation department,39
in writing or orally. The code of criminal procedure requires a transcript
of an orally submitted querela, which must be signed by the complain-
29. C.P. art. 636; Le Leggi, supra note 18.
30. C.P. art. 639(2); Le Leggi, supra note 18.
31. C.P. art. 640; Le Leggi, supra note 18.
32. C.P. art. 640(3); Le Leggi, supra note 18.
33. Van Cleave, supra note 17, at 430-31; Pizzi & Marafioti, The New Italian Code of
Criminal Procedure, supra, note 17, at 20-26.
34. C.'. art. 594.
35. C.p. art. 595.
36. See generally FAUSTO GIUNTA, INTERESSI PRIVATI E DEFLAZIONE PENALE NELL'USO
DELLA QUERELA 13 (1993).
37. C.i. art. 120.
38. C.i. art. 124.
39. DE FRANCHIS, supra note 10, at 1088.
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ant, or his or her agent.4° The official to whom the victim submits the
querela must certify the date and place where the querela was submitted,
as well as the identification of the complainant, and the transfer of all of
this material to the pubblico ministero1 The Penal Code further states
that the right of querela "may not be exercised if it has been expressly or
implicitly waived by the person entitled to exercise it."42 The complain-
ant may also withdraw the querela by submitting a declaration to that
effect to the appropriate official.43 In summary, if a victim does not exer-
cise this right within three months, or exercises it but subsequently
waives or withdraws the querela, the offender goes unpunished.
When the Italian Penal Code requires a querela for rape, the rules
are different in two significant ways. First, the victim has six months,
rather than three months to submit a querela." Second, a querela for
rape, once presented, is irrevocable; the victim may not expressly or im-
plicitly waive or withdraw it.45 Section III of this Article explores these
differences under the rape law reform of 1996. Before considering this
reform, the next section explores the history of the querela in Italy.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Before the unification of Italy, the regional governments were split
over the use of the querela. Under the Sardinian Penal Code of 1859,
which covered Sardinia as well as northern regions such as Piedmont,
Lombardy, Venetia, Parma and Modena,46 rape was prosecuted d'ufficio,
or automatically, 7 even though this code required a querela for other
48offenses such as adultery. Although late 18th century Tuscan law re-
quired prosecution of rape committed without violence by querela,
40. C.P.p. art. 337.
41. Id.
42. C.s. art. 124(3).
43. C.p.p. arts. 339, 340.
44. C.p. art. 609 septies, para. 2 (providing victim six months days to submit a querela for
rape); C.P. art. 124 (providing victim three months to submit a querela for other of-
fenses that require it).
45. C.s. art. 609 septies, para. 3 ("Once submitted, the querela is irrevocable"); C.s.s. arts
339, 340 (setting out the procedures for renouncing or withdrawing a querela for
other offenses).
46. Edward M. Wise, Introduction to THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES:
THE ITALIAN PENAL CODE xxi (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1978).
47. Maddalena del Re, I1 Regime di procedibilitd nei delitti sessuali in I REATI SESSUAL
217, 222-23 (Coppi, ed., 2000).
48. GIUNTA, supra note 36, at 7, n.7.
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Tuscany's 1853 Penal Code abolished this provision and required auto-
matic prosecution of all rapes.49 By contrast, the Penal Code of the Two
Sicilies of 1819, covering southern regions such as Naples, required
prosecution by querela.5° Faced with this split, the drafters of the 1889
Zanardelli Penal Code, the first Penal Code of unified Italy, had to de-
cide whether to include a querela requirement for any offenses,
including rape.
The decision to include the querela in the Zanardelli Penal Code il-
lustrates how this institution, from its inception, posed challenges to its
drafters to reconcile theoretical bases of the criminal justice system with
a device that removes official control over the decision to prosecute cer-
tain offenses. The Zanardelli drafters claimed to have been influenced by
the Enlightenment Era,5 which reflected limits on the power of the state
to punish individuals. In particular, the drafters were influenced by the
writings of Cesare Beccaria,52 specifically his treatise On Crimes and Pun-
ishments published in 1764."3 Beccaria is most commonly credited with
influencing the abolition of torture and capital punishment.54 He also
set out principles regarding the limitations on the state's power to pun-
ish. These included the idea that the state could only punish conduct
that is dangerous to the state or to others, that the severity of punish-
ment should be limited to only what is required to achieve deterrence,
and that certainty of punishment is more important, for purposes of
deterrence, than severity of punishment.55 Particularly significant is the
49. Id. at 8.
50. Id. at 7. The Estense Code of 1771 also required prosecution of rape by querela.
Codice Estense, vol. I, Bk. V, Title XI, art. VIII, Biblioteca Estense, Modena, Italy
("To avoid .disgracing the families [involved in rape and other carnal crimes] only the
following individuals may submit a querela: the deflowered, her father, her mother,
and her brothers.").
51. Floriana Colao, II diritto penale politico nel codice Zanardelli in DiRITrro PENALE
DELL'OTroCENTO: I CODICI PREUNITARI E IL CODICE ZANARDELLI 652, 655 (Sergio
Vinciguerra, ed., 1999).
52. See generally Wise, supra note 4, at xxii (discussing Beccaria's influence); Isabella
Rosoni, Dalle codificazioni preunitari al codice Rocco in INTRODUZIONE AL SISTEMA
PENALE 3, 18 (A. Cadoppi et al., eds., 2nd ed., 2000).
53. HENRY PAOLUCCI, Introduction to CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS,
at ix, ix-x (Henry Paolucci trans., 1963).
54. Joshua E. Kastenberg, An Enlightened Addition to the Original Meaning: Voltaire and
the Eighth Amendment's Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 5 TEMPLE
POL. & Clv. RTs. L. REv. 49, 55-56 (1995); see, e.g., Dawn Macready, Note, The
"Shocking" Truth About the Electric Chair: An Analysis of the Unconstitutionality of
Electrocution, 29 OHIO N.U. L. Rav. 781, 782 (2000); see also MARCELLO T. MAES-
TRO, VOLTAIRE AND BECCARIA AS REFORMERS oF CRIMINAL LAW (1942).
55. CARL LUDWIG VON BAR, ET AL., A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CRIMINAL LAW 413-
15 (Thomas S. Bell et al. trans., 1916).
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notion, derived in part from Beccaria's writings, that "punishment in-
flicted by the State" is not identical to "a pouring out of divine Justice.
'5 6
That is, sins and crimes are distinct and the State is justified in punish-
ing only the latter. This contradicts John Calvin, who argued that the
state "owed a duty to God to enforce [God's] laws."57
Beccaria's writings espoused the idea that the state should maintain
sole control over the imposition of punishment. While he did not write
about the querela specifically, Beccaria opposed allowing victims to par-
don their offenders because this would not guarantee certainty of
punishment.58 Beccaria further argued that "[t]he right to inflict pun-
ishment is a right not of an individual, but of all citizens, or of their
sovereign."59 Thus, according to this theory, the state's role is both lim-
ited, in terms of what conduct the state may punish, and exclusive, since
the state controls the infliction of punishment. The querela is in tension
with both of these underpinnings of Beccaria's theory because it allows
for punishment of merely immoral conduct and allows the victim to
decide whether prosecution proceeds. Furthermore, a decision to require
the querela for rape indicates a determination that rape constitutes im-
moral rather than illegal conduct.
The principle that guided the distinction between sins and crimes
was that the state was justified in inflicting punishment only for conduct
that "violates or endangers the rights of others." 0 This principle begs the
question of how to define the rights of others that the state is to protect.
The Italian term for the rights entitled to state protection is bene gi-
uridico, which Watkin translates as a legal "good, a benefit or an asset"
and includes "life, physical integrity, property, family relationship, [and]
livelihood." 6' The purpose of the concept bene giuridico was, at least in
theory, to decriminalize conduct that offended only religious or moral
values, or individual modesty. Thus, no matter how contemptible cer-
tain conduct was, such as sodomy or obscenity, it was not criminal
because the conduct did not harm a recognized bene giuridico.62 How-
ever, the Zanardelli Code included adultery and concubinage as
56. Id. at415.
57. Kastenberg, supra note 54, at 52.
58. Santoro, Querela, supra note 14.
59. CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 58 (Henry Paolucci trans., 1963).
60. VON BAR, supra note 55, at 414.
61. THOMAS GLYN WATKIN, THE ITALIAN LEGAL TRADITION 122 (1997).
62. Giovanni Fiandaca, I Reati Sessuali nel Pensiero di Francesco Carrara: Un Onorevole
Compromesso tra Audacia Illuministica e Rispetto per a Tradizione, 1988 RIVISTA
ITALIANA DI DIRIT TO E DI PROCEDURA PENALE [Riv. it. dir. proc. pen.] 903, 908
(Italy).
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crimes. 63 The reasoning by which the drafters reconciled Enlightenment
thinking with the decision to define adultery as criminal conduct is rele-
vant to examining the justifications for requiring a querela for rape.
Francesco Carrara, one of the principal scholars involved in draft-
ing the Zanardelli Code,6 reasoned that adultery harmed society by
threatening the institution of marriage and the family. Thus, the state
was justified in punishing this type of sexual misconduct.6' Nonetheless,
the drafters decided that adultery was to be prosecuted only by querela,
that is, upon the other spouse's request for prosecution. The reasons for
requiring a querela were based on the importance of protecting the fam-
ily from possible negative consequences of such prosecutions.66 The
drafters reasoned that leaving the decision of whether to prosecute in the
hands of the harmed spouse would best protect the family from the
publicity and embarrassment involved in a criminal trial.67 This implied
that the importance of the family overshadowed that of spousal fidelity
and even society's interests in condemning sexual misconduct.68 The
Zanardelli drafters were also concerned that automatic prosecution of
adultery would preclude the possibility that family unity would be re-
stored. 69 That is, if prosecution was not automatic, a greater possibility
existed that a husband and wife would reconcile rather than formally
accuse one or the other of adultery or concubinage. The Zanardelli
drafters extended both of these rationales to the crime of rape.7
The drafters concluded that it was necessary to ensure that families
decide whether to pursue charges of rape or to shield the family from
the embarrassment that might result from a criminal trial. A frequently
quoted statement in support of prosecuting rape by querela maintained
that:
[I] t would not be good for public morals or for the peace and
honor of the domestic hearth to cast the large light of justice
on intimate events too readily, since public charges could re-
sult in greater harm than good to those individuals and
families that the law seeks to protect. Thus, it is more prudent
63. C.. (1889) arts. 353-54.
64. Wise, supra note 46, at xxv.
65. Fiandaca, I reati sessuali, supra note 62, at 917.
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to allow those who have been harmed decide how best to pro-
tect themselves.71
This quote illustrates how the drafters viewed the harm involved in
rape. The main harm was that suffered by the family. The privacy and
autonomy of the victim were not of central concern, if they were even
considered at all.
The need to allow for the possibility of reconciliation also justified
the querela for rape. Both the Zanardelli Code and the Rocco Code that
followed it in 1930 expressly provided for reparatory marriage. That is,
if the person accused of rape entered into a marriage contract with the
victim, criminal proceedings would end.73 In fact, even if marriage was
contracted after conviction of the accused, punishment was not to be
imposed nor were any other consequences stemming from a criminal
conviction to take effect. 74 This doctrine applied even if the accused used
violence or threats of violence to commit the rape. This institution was
abolished only recently in Italy.75 The goal of reparatory marriage was to
repair or compensate for the harm done to the victim's family that
would otherwise be left with a non-virgin of marriageable age. As Vargas
has asserted, this solution indicated that the legal interest at issue was
"the loss of opportunity to contract marriage resulting from the loss of
one's virginity. 76 The querela requirement not only enabled, but argua-
bly encouraged, this form of private resolution. This is similar to how
the law of the 1700s in parts of Italy encouraged forms of private pun-
ishments such as requiring the rapist to provide the victim's family with
a dowry for the victim so that she might be able to marry, thus empha-
sizing the economic value of virginity.7
71. del Re, supra note 47, at 223; see ako MARIA VIRGILIO, VIOLENZA SESSUALE E
NoRMA: LEGISLAZIONI PENALI A CONFRONTO 98 (1997).
72. C.P. (1930) art. 544; C.P. (1889) art. 352.
73. Id.
74. Gabriella Colagrande, I delitti contro la liberta sessuale fra querela remissibile e
procedibilith d'ufficio, DIFESA PENALE, July-Sept. 1983, at 115-116 (Italy); Fermo
Benussi, Delle denuncie e de& querele nel nuovo Codice di Procedura Penale (art. 149-
161), 1913 GIUSTIZIA PENALE 775, 782-83.
75. Le Leggi, Aug. 5, 1981, n. 4 42.
76. See Gladys Acosta Vargas, Conceptualizing the Law from a Gender Perspective: Concep-
tions Regarding Victim and Accused, 7 AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 319, 327
(1999).
77. See Daniele Peccianti, Gli inconvenienti della repressione dello stupro nella giustizia
criminale senese: II dilagare delle querele nel settecento, in CRIMINALITX E SOCIETX IN
ETX MODERNA 477 (Luigi Berlinguer & Floriana Colao eds., 1991).
2007]
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
Cazzetta describes how the practical effect of the decision to require
a querela for rape exemplifies "the crowning logic of the distinction be-
tween law and morality" propounded by the Zanardelli drafters.78
Prevailing penal theory in the second half of the 1800s set out a clear
line between law and morality and claimed that the criminal law was to
be invoked only when rights were harmed, but not "to punish passions
or bad instincts."79 Punishment for the purpose of protecting the virtue
of modesty would be a patent violation of personal liberty since modesty
is not a bene giuridico.8" Cazzetta asserts that this reasoning resulted, as a
practical matter, in the decriminalization of stupro semplice, simple rape.
The focus on the distinction between law and morality led the drafters
to conclude that the state was justified in limiting only violent conduct.
Since stupro semplice did not involve violence, there was no violation of
any right of the victim requiring the law's protection.
These theories about the purposes of the criminal law combined
with changing views of women to influence the treatment of rape.
Throughout much of Italy's history, the law has treated women as weak,
inferior to men, and in need of protection. 8 Enlightenment thinking,
however, supported the idea that men and women are equal, comparing
the family to a republic rather than to a king and his kingdom."' These
modern thoughts resulted in a provision in the 1865 Italian Civil Code
establishing that father and mother could both exercise patria potesth, or
parental authority.83 Such limited recognition of equality between men
and women influenced the penal theorists of the mid-1800s, who de-
termined that women were to be treated as individuals and capable of
consenting to intercourse.84 This acknowledgment of women's capacity,
as opposed to the earlier conception of women as children, could be
viewed as furthering the rights of women. However, the thinking of
these theorists further concluded that women who engaged in inter-
course outside of marriage did not require the protection of the criminal
law; rather, such women were seen as dangerous seductresses and thus
78. Giovanni Cazetta, "Colpevole col consentire:" Dallo stupro alla violenza sessuale nella
penalistica dell'Ottocento, 1997 RIv. IT. DIR. PRAC. PEN. 424, 430.
79. GIOVANNI CAZZETrA, PRASUMITER SEDUCTA: ONESTX E CONSENSO FEMMINILE
NELLA CULTURA GIURIDICA MODERNA 247 (1999) (characterizing Carrara's penal
theory).
80. Cazetta, supra note 78, at 429-30.
81. See MANLIO BELLOMO, LA CONDIZIONE GIURIDICA DELLA DONNA IN ITALIA:
VICENDE ANTICHE E MODERNE 58 (1996).
82. Id. at 93.
83. Id. at 93-95. For translation of patria potestd see DE FRANCHIS, supra note 10, at
1056.
84. See Cazetta, supra note 78, at 433; see aso, Giovanni Cazzetta, Prxsumiter Seducta:
Onesta e Consenso Femminile nella Cultura Giuridica Moderna 254 (1999).
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accomplices, not victims."' Yet, not all women were viewed this way;
81
virtuous women were considered worthy of protection from seducers.
The dichotomous view of women led to the following logic: "the
vulgar, dishonest, and ill-bred woman would go before a court with an
accusation of rape, just as easily as she goes about seducing men, thus
she must have consented to sexual intercourse., 7 On the other hand,
"the honest woman would not create an uproar or make a public com-
plaint, but instead suffer in silence, even though she had actually been
seduced or raped and thus had not consented. '8 8 Therefore, the distinc-
tion between a woman who did not consent and one who did consent
was based on whether she sought justice in the courts; the virtuous
woman did not, and therefore had not consented and was, in fact raped,
but her rapist was not punished, while the vulgar woman sought justice,
and therefore consented and had not been raped and her alleged rapist
was not punished.89
The Italian scholar Maddalena del Re explains that the intertwining
of the "modern" theory that women are free to consent to sexual inter-
course and the continuing force of the need to protect virtuous women,
along with the tradition of the querela requirement for the crime of rape,
led to the decriminalization of stupro semplice, intercourse without con-
sent. 0 Since the querela requires the victim's formal and public
accusation of rape, any woman who presents a querela will be viewed,
not only as vulgar, but also as guilty along with the accused. Conse-
quently, women were unlikely to come forward to present a querela and
risk being prosecuted themselves for either defamation or for filing a
false complaint.9' Thus, the querela served as a barrier to rape prosecu-
tions; such prosecutions would not happen unless the victim presented a
querela, but the stigma attached to such an action effectively discouraged
women from formally denouncing their rapists.
Under the Zanardelli Code, the features of the querela were the
same for all of the offenses prosecuted this way; no distinction was made
between rape and other offenses. Victims had one year from the date of
the offense to present a querela and could revoke this request up to the
beginning of the trial. As to rape, the following scenarios required
prosecution d'ufficio: if the victim died as a consequence of or during
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Cazetta, supra note 78, at 446.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See del Re, supra note 47, at 222.
91. Id.
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the rape, if the rape was committed in a public place, if the rape
constituted an abuse of patria potestz, or if the rape was committed in
connection with another offense, punishable by at least thirty months
imprisonment and which was prosecuted d'ufficio.12 Unlike the Penal
Code provisions of the pre-unification regions that had required a
querela for rape, the Zanardelli Code did not make an exception for
situations where the rape was committed with the use of force or
violence, or where it was committed by a public official;" in such cases
the law required a querela. By requiring a querela even when violence or
force was used to commit the rape, the Zanardelli Code stigmatized
these victims as well as those women who simply had not consented to
intercourse.
Attitudes regarding women and rape changed very little by the time
the 1930 Rocco Penal Code was drafted. This code retained the institu-
tion of reparatory marriage. 94 In addition, while the Penal Code
continued to criminalize seduction of minors,9 abduction of a woman
for the purpose of marriage, 96 and abduction of a woman for purposes of
lust,97 there was often a presumption that women had consented to the
seduction, or were perhaps even the instigators of it.9' Given such views,
it is not surprising that the Rocco Code drafters did not question main-
taining the querela requirement for rape. The justification given differed
very little from that espoused by the Zanardelli drafters: "to avoid bring-
ing to light episodes that involved one's intimate life and often remain
unknown or even ignored, and as to which the publicity of a trial would
result in greater harm than good for the victims." 99 Such language evokes
an image of women in need of the state's paternalistic protection from
the publicity of a rape trial, rather than focusing on the need to protect
women from the rape in the first place. This paternalism was in tension
with notions that women were somehow responsible for or complicit in
the alleged rape. Nonetheless, the querela requirement for rape under the
Rocco Code mostly tracked that of the Zanardelli Code, only with fewer
exceptions to the querela requirement, thus requiring a querela in more
cases. The only exceptions to the querela requirement under the Rocco
92. C.P. (1889) art. 336.
93. GIUNTA, supra note 36, at 9.
94. C.P. (1930) art. 544; see VICTORIA DE Gi ~ziA, How FASCISM RULED WOMEN: ITALY,
1922-1945 90 (1992).
95. C.i'. (1930) art. 526.
96. C.i. (1930) art. 522.
97. C.P. (1930) art. 523.
98. See DE GRAziA, supra note 94, at 139 ("Custom as well as law presumed the woman
to be a consenting party to her seduction, if not actually the instigator").
99. VIRGILIO, supra note 71, at 98.
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Code were if the crime was committed by a parent or guardian or by a
public official, or the crime was committed in connection with another
offense which is prosecuted dlufficio.'00 Only in these two situations was
rape to be prosecuted d'ufficio.
By contrast, the two codes diverged dramatically on the issue of
revocability. As mentioned above, the Zanardelli Code allowed a victim
the opportunity to revoke or withdraw the querela right up to the be-
ginning of the trial, as to all offenses prosecuted by querela. Under the
Rocco Code, a prosecution of rape by querela became irrevocable. The
justifications advanced for prohibiting revocation of a querela relied on
images of women, especially unmarried women, and their families that
differ sharply from the images of "weak" women in need of protection
from the embarrassment of bringing forward charges of rape. One oft-
repeated purpose for making the querela irrevocable was to prevent or
discourage "vile arrangements and risqu6 blackmailing, which, given the
very delicate nature of these crimes, would be possible if there were a
right to withdraw" the querela.'0' This seems to indicate a concern about
false accusations of rape by unmarried women, especially when this con-
cern is considered in connection with reparatory marriage. As
mentioned earlier, the Rocco Code provided for the extinction of certain
sexual offenses when the perpetrator and the victim married. 12 The ap-
parent fear was that unmarried women, or their families, who wanted to
encourage marriage to a particular man could submit a querela charging
rape. Aside from an acquittal, the only way to avoid punishment would
be for the man to marry the woman.' 3
Another concern may have been that upon filing a querela a woman
or her family could then demand a monetary settlement from the al-
leged rapist. Upon the agreement of the parties the querela could then be
withdrawn. Indeed, de Grazia describes "the widespread opinion that the
lower-class girl who purportedly exploited her sexual desirability to seduce
a young man of good family was more reprehensible than the man who
preyed on a virgin, for the former could not make amends through mar-
riage."'0 4 There are a number of problems with this. First, such settlements
are permitted as to other offenses prosecuted by querela, yet there is not
the same concern about false accusations. Second, such a rationale evokes
100. C.p. (1930) art. 542.
101. Maria Virgilio, Articolo 8 in COMMENTARIO DELLE "NORME CONTRO LA VIOLENZA
SESSUALE" 271, 278 (2002).
102. C.P. (1930) art. 544.
103. See supra notes72-74 and accompanying text.
104. DE GiziA, How FASCISM RULED WOMEN, supra note 94, at 139.
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images of vengeful women or scheming and opportunistic families of
women. Despite the inconsistencies and stereotypes present in these jus-
tifications, Italy's Constitutional Court has relied on similar depictions
of women in upholding the irrevocability of the querela.
Rape defendants have challenged the irrevocability of the querela
for rape on the grounds that this violates the constitutional provision
that guarantees equality,"5 because as to all other offenses requiring a
querela, a victim may revoke a querela up to the time of the trial. These
defendants have argued that one purpose of the querela is to allow vic-
tims of these types of offenses to decide whether prosecution should
proceed.10 6 Likewise, victims ought to have an opportunity to reflect on
whether they wish to continue prosecutions that they have already initi-
ated.10 7 Italy's Constitutional Court has rejected these arguments on
several occasions.1°s
In upholding the differing norms regarding revocability, Italy's
Constitutional Court noted that allegations of rape present special con-
cerns not involved in other crimes requiring a querela. °9 Specifically, the
Court recognized that there is no single and uniform purpose served by
the querela requirement. Therefore, the legislature can consider different
interests furthered by this institution in deciding upon which types of
offenses to impose the querela. The legislature has determined that de-
spite the seriousness of sexual offenses, the victim's privacy interests
outweigh the government's interest in prosecuting these crimes when the
victim does not wish to proceed. Thus, the court reinforced the pater-
nalistic role of the state in protecting women from such publicity. The
court then stated that given the danger that the criminal process might
be used or otherwise subordinated for other purposes, the legislature
decided to limit the importance of privacy interests the moment at
which the victim has chosen to invoke the criminal system by making
the querela irrevocable." The concern that victims might make im-
proper use of the querela closely parallels the Rocco Code drafter's fears
of false rape accusations. The court also noted that once the victim pre-
sents a querela, her privacy interests have already been compromised;
105. COST. 1948 art. 3.
106. See Colagrande, supra note 74.
107. Id.
108. Corte cost., Apr. 30, 1984, n.1 2 8 ; Corte cost., Apr. 12, 1978, n.42; Corte cost., Mar.
23, 1975, n. 75; Corte cost., June 27, 1974, n.216; see also VIRGILIO, supra note 71,
at 116.
109. See, Corte cost., June 27, 1974.
110. Id., n. 216.
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therefore, continuing prosecution despite her subsequent wishes will not
run counter to the purposes of requiring a querela in the first place."'
The history of the querela in Italy reveals that use of this institution
for prosecuting rape has relied on dichotomous views of women. On the
one hand, women were seen as needing protection from embarrassing
trials so they were given the choice of whether to prosecute. On the
other hand, such request was irrevocable under the Rocco Code because
women might exploit the querela to force marriage or to extract money
from the accused rapist. Throughout the twenty years during which It-
aly struggled with reforming its rape law, the question of whether the
querela should survive remained contentious.
III. THE 1996 REFORM
Serious attention was given to reforming Italy's rape law in 1979
when a proposed law was submitted to the legislature by popular initia-
tive." 2 Three hundred thousand Italians signed a proposal that revamped
rape law."3 One of the most important aspects of this proposal was how
it classified sex crimes. Previously, these offenses were set out under the
section of the Penal Code entitled "Delitti contro la morale pubblica e il
buon costume," or crimes against public morality and decency." ' The
proposed law, and the law ultimately adopted in 1996, moved the provi-
sions defining sexual offenses to the section of the Penal Code entitled
"Delitti contro la persona," crimes against the person or crimes against
the individual."5 While predominantly symbolic, this change is signifi-
cant because it recognizes that rape and other crimes involving sexual
assault harm the individual victims more than they harm society." 6 In
addition, this categorical change represents the state's primary goal of
protecting individual sexual liberty, in those terms, and not simply pro-
tecting public morals by prosecuting sexual offenses." 7 Such a statement
111. Id.
112. TINA LAGOSTENA BAsSI, AGATA ALMA CAPPIELLO AND GIAcoMo F. REICH, VIOLENZA
SESSUALE: 20 ANNI PER UNA LEGGE 33-37 (1998) (reproducing the 1979 proposed
law as well as summaries and excerpts of the debates over the course of the 20 years
during which reforms were considered by the Italian Parliament).
113. Id. at33.
114. See WISE, supra note 4, at 177 for translation.
115. See Amy Jo Everhart, Note, Predicting the Effect of Italy's Long-Awaited Rape Law
Reform on "The Land of Machismo ", 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L LAW 671, 693 (1998).
116. PITCH, supra note 6, at 150.
117. MARTA BERTOLINO, LIBERTX SESSUALE E TUTELA PENALE 83 (1993) [hereinafter
BERTOLINO, LiBERTX SESSUALE]; Marta Bertolino, Garantismo e Scopi di Tutela Nella
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is important because it attempts to eschew the idea that the victims of
such crimes, predominantly women, can be used as instruments to fur-
ther public or societal definitions of proper sexual conduct or other
goals related to public morality.1 18 The need for this change was only
somewhat controversial and only early on in the reform process during
the 1970s." 9 Otherwise, no one involved in reforming Italy's rape law
questioned the need to re-categorize the sexual assault crimes.
In contrast to the lack of controversy over the decision to change
how rape is categorized under the Penal Code, the institution of the
querela was one of the most controversial topics during the process of
reforming the law on rape. 120 Initially, advocates for reform were united
in their desire to do away with the querela.12 1 Indeed, the preamble to
the Penal Code proposed by popular initiative in 1979 stated, "given the
serious nature of rape, it must be prosecuted d'ufficio" and "it is simply
inconceivable that the burden of this decision should be placed only on
the victim.' 22 The popular initiative specifically rejected the argument
that the querela protects women's self-determination, characterizing this
as a "false protection," and included no exceptions to prosecution
d'ufficio.
123
When the Italian Parliament initially considered the public-
initiated reform, many members argued that there should be an excep-
tion to d'ufficio prosecution when the alleged rapist is the cohabitant or
spouse of the victim. 124 These members expressed the concern that
automatic prosecution would preclude reconciliation and thus the pos-
sibility that intervention by the state in prosecuting one spouse would
harm the family.125 The goal of encouraging familial reconciliation paral-
Nuova Disciplina dei Reati di Violenza Sessuale, XLIV Jus RIVISTA DI SCIENZE
GIuURDICHE 51, 53 (1997) [hereinafter Bertolino, Garantismo].
118. Francesco Romano, La Violenza Sessuale: Luci ed Ombre Nella Normativa Vigente e
Nelle Prospettive di Riforma, )OUII GIURISPRUDENZA DI MERITO 436, 441 (1991).
119. Bertolino, Garantismo, supra note 117, at 53; see also David Brunelli, Bene Giuridico e
Politica Criminal Nella Riforma dei Reati a Sfondo Sessuale in I REATI SESSUALI 25
(Franco Coppi ed., 2000) (discussing the 1996 law's classification of sex crimes).
120. See I REATI SEssuALI, supra note 3, at 21; Bertolino, Garantismo, supra note 117, at
74; VIRGILIO, supra note 71, at 101.
121. BAssI ET AL., supra note 112.
122. Id. at 33.
123. Id. at 34.
124. Id. at 38.
125. Pitch quotes a famous Italian saying, "Tra moglie e marito non mettere il dito,"
which translates to "Don't put even a finger between husband and wife." PITCH, su-
pra note 6, at 154. She explains that this saying, as well as the reluctance to prosecute
spousal rape d'ufficio, reflects the traditional idea that the State's role is to protect the
family unit and to intervene as little as possible in these relationships. Id.
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lels that expressed by the drafters of the Zanardelli and Rocco Codes.
Some Senators opposed such an exception, arguing that the imbalance
of power between the victim and the rapist is greatest when the victim is
the spouse, making it even more difficult for the victim to exercise her
right of querela, with the result that the crime goes unpunished.
126
Women's groups remained in agreement that rape be prosecuted
d'ufficio.
During the Tenth Legislature, between the years 1987 and 1992,
disagreement over the querela re-emerged. 127 Again the focus of the de-
bate was whether to include an exception for spouses and cohabitants.
1 28
The argument against such an exception focused on the nature of the
harm inflicted by sex crimes, beginning with the premise that sexual
assault is no longer a crime against public morals or against the honor of
the victim and her family, rather it is a crime of violence against the vic-
tim and harms her sexual autonomy.129 Thus, protection of the victim's
honor previously afforded by the querela is no longer a goal of the
criminal law. Such an argument began to give substantive meaning to
the predominantly symbolic nature of the changed classification of sex
crimes. That is, by arguing that conceptualizing rape as a crime against
the person rather than a crime against public morals, the law should no
longer afford relevance to the purity of the victim based on her willing-
ness to pursue prosecution.
In 1989, the focus of the debates surrounding the querela was no
longer whether to include an exception for spouses and cohabitants.
Rather, some Senators began to present arguments against prosecution
d'ufficio, favoring instead the continuation of a querela requirement.
One Senator asked, "Does prosecution d'ufficio help and support rape
victims, or does it drag them into a controversy they want to avoid, or
are not in a position to handle?"13 In addition, concerns were raised that
prosecution d'ufficio could mean prosecution against the wishes of the
victim. Indeed, some Senators stated that a victim might prefer not to
prosecute for a variety of reasons, including her wish to forgive the rap-
ist."3 Others countered that the best way to protect the autonomy and
liberty of the victim was to prosecute and punish those who infringe on
these interests. 132
126. See, e.g, BAssi ET AL., Supra note 112, at 44(quoting Senator Marinucci).
127. See generally id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 59.
130. Id. at 65.
131. Id. at 66.
132. Id.
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Stronger support for maintaining the querela is evident in the legis-
lative debates between the years 1994-96, immediately before the
reform was enacted. Pointing to the significance in the reclassification of
rape as a crime against an individual, one Senator argued that "prosecu-
tion by querela affirms the individual nature of sexual offenses [and] . ..
demonstrates that the legal order assigns greater value to the individual
victim's interests over those of the community. ,133
In the end, the 1996 law maintained the querela requirement. 3 4 Be-
fore describing Article 609 septies of the Penal Code, the following
subsection provides an overview of the 1996 rape law.
A. Rape Under the New Law
Above, this Essay describes the important symbolic change in how
sex crimes are categorized. That is, these offenses are no longer under
the portion of the Penal Code entitled "crimes against public morality
and decency," which includes offenses such as obscene acts 35 and ob-
scene publications and performances. 13 Instead the sexual offenses are
now set out under the title defining "crimes against the person," which
includes offenses such as homicide,
37 assault, 138 insult, 39 defamation,
40
slavery,'4' false imprisonment, 142 threats,'43 violation of the home, 44 and
disclosure of professional secrets.'45 This change eliminated the anachro-
nistic notion that the importance of criminalizing certain sexual conduct
was primarily to protect societal values, rather than to protect the sexual
autonomy of the victim. 4 6 The 1996 law also repealed 4 7 a number of
anachronistic offenses, such as "abduction for purposes of marriage, " "'
133. Id. at 69.
134. C.P. art. 609 septies ("The crimes set out in articles 609 bis, ter, and quater are pun-
ishable upon the querela of the victim.").
135. C.P. (1930) art. 527.
136. C.P. (1930) art. 528.
137. C.. art. 575.
138. C.P. art. 581.
139. C.. art. 594.
140. C. . art. 595.
141. C.P. art. 600.
142. C.P. art. 605.
143. C.P. art. 612.
144. C.P. art. 614.
145. C.r. art. 622.
146. BRUNELLI, supra note 119, at 47.
147. Le Leggi, Feb. 15, 1996, n.66 art. 1.
148. C.P. art.. 522 ("Whoever, by violence, threats or deceit, takes away or detains an un-
married woman, for purposes of marriage, shall be punished by imprisonment for
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and "seduction through promise of marriage committed by a married
,,149
person.
As to the specific provisions delineating sexual offenses, Article 609
bis defines "simple sexual assault"15 as the use of violence, threats, or
abuse of authority to force the victim to perform or submit to sexual
acts. The prescribed punishment is five to ten years imprisonment, rais-
ing the minimum from three years under the prior law; the maximum
punishment remains the same. The 1996 law punishes the following
with the same sentence of five to ten years: whoever takes advantage of a
physical or mental infirmity of the victim, is present at the time of the
offense, or who deceives the victim by impersonating another person
and thereby causes the victim to perform or submit to sexual acts."'
One of the most significant aspects of this Article is that the legislature
substituted the term "sexual acts" for the terms "carnal intercourse" and
"acts of lust" criminalized in separate articles under the prior provisions
of the Penal Code.15 2 The reason for eliminating the distinctions of the
prior law was to avoid the evidentiary issues necessary to determine
which crime, if any, was involved.153 The important evidence usually
required humiliating testimony from the victim describing in detail the
offender's conduct, and had the effect of turning the victim into the
"second defendant., 154 In addition, abrogating this distinction attempted
to ensure the same level of punishment for such conduct.155
The effectiveness of eradicating the above distinction is
questionable because the third paragraph of Article 609 bis states that in
less serious cases, the punishment is to be reduced, but not by more
than two-thirds. This means that in such cases of minore gravitd, or less
seriousness, the possible sentence must be between a minimum of one
year and eight months and a maximum of three years and four
from one to three years. If this act is committed against an unmarried person of either
sex over the age of fourteen years but under the age of eighteen, the imprisonment
shall be for from two to five years.").
149. C.P. art. 526. ("Whoever, by a promise of marriage, seduces a woman who is under
age, having misled her as to his own status as a married person, shall be punished by
imprisonment for from three months to two years. Seduction shall occur when there
has been carnal intercourse.").
150. Virgilio, supra note 101, at 317.
151. C.P. art. 609 bis, para. 2.
152. Compare C.P. art. 609 bis with C.I. (1930) art. 527 and C.P. (1930) art. 528.
153. Everhart, supra note 115, at 692.
154. BRUNELLI, supra note 119, at 33; Alberto Cadoppi, Articolo 3 in COMMENTARIO
DELLE NORME CONTRO LAW VIOLENZA SESSUALE 25, 27 (Cadoppi ed., 1999).
155. Everhart, supra note 115, at 692.
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months.5 6 The purpose of this subpart is to ensure that an offender does
not receive a punishment disproportionate to his or her conduct,
especially since the new law raised the minimum sentence for sexual
assault.5 7 However, the new law does not define or specify the types of
scenarios involving less seriousness, and therefore justifying a lesser
sentence. Instead, this determination is left to the discretion of the
judge. '5 8
In contrast to the lack of specificity with respect to cases justifying a
lesser sentence, Article 609 ter defines aggravating circumstances that
increase the range of punishment to six to twelve years when, with re-
spect to the offense set out in Article 609 bis, any of the following
circumstances is present: 1) the victim is less than 14 years of age; 2) the
defendant used weapons, alcoholic substances, narcotics, drugs or other
instruments or substances posing a serious danger to the health of the
victim; 3) the defendant is disguised or otherwise feigns that he is a pub-
lic official or otherwise engaged in public duties; 4) the victim is
otherwise subject to limitations on her personal freedom; or 5) the vic-
tim is less than sixteen years of age and the defendant is her ascendant,
parent, including adoptive parents, or guardian. The last paragraph of
this Article further increases the possible sentence to seven to fourteen
years if the victim is less than ten years of age.
5
1
The next Article defines violenza presunta or statutory rape 60 where
there is no need to prove violence, threats, or abuse of authority as re-
quired by Article 609 bis. Article 609 quarter sets out two forms of this
offense. One situation is when the offender engages in sexual acts with a
minor not yet fourteen years of age.' 6' Another form of presumptive
sexual consent is when the victim is a minor not yet sixteen but older
than fourteen years of age and the offender is the victim's ascendant,
parent, including adoptive parents, guardian, or is any other person to
whom the victim has been entrusted for purposes of the minor's care,
education, instruction, supervision, or custody, or any person who is
156. S. BELTRANI AND R. MARINO, LE NUOVE NoRME SULLA VIOLENZE SESSUALE:
COMMENTO SISTEMATICO ALLA LEGGE N.6 50 (1996).
157. Roberto Borgogno, Ildelitto di Violenza Sessuale in I REATi SESSUALI, 71, 85.(Franco
Coppi ed., 2000).
158. Id. at 86; Maria Virgilio, La Violenza Alle Donne: Risposte Delle Istituzioni Dopo La
Legge Contro La Violenza Sessuale in VIOLENZE ALLE DONNE E RISPOSTE DELLE
ISTITUZIONI 181, 184 (Patrizia Romito ed., 2000); Sergio Moccia, Il sistema delle
circostanze e le fattispecie qualificate nella riforma del diritto penale sessulae: un esempio
paradigmatico di sciatteria legislativa, 1997 Rivista Italiana Diritto di Procedura
Penale 395, 396.
159. C.p. art. 609, quater para. 2.
160. DE FRANCHIS, supra note 10, at 1455.
161. C.p. art. 609 quarter.
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cohabitating with the minor. 62 This Article provides for the same pun-
ishment as Article 609 bis, five to ten years imprisonment, and allows
for the same two-thirds reduction for less serious cases. Nonetheless, if
the victim is less than ten years of age, the punishment is from seven to
163fourteen years, as under 609 ter.
The new law also narrowed the offense of corruption of minors.
This offense punishes anyone who engages in sexual acts in the presence
of a minor less than fourteen years of age, with the goal of having the
minor participate in such acts. 164 The prior law set the age of the victim
at sixteen years, thus such conduct in the presence of a minor fourteen
years of age or older does not amount to the crime of corruption of a
minor. The punishment of six months to three years is the same as it was
under the prior law. 65 As to all of the offenses involving victims less than
fourteen years of age, the offender may not claim as a defense mistake as
to or ignorance of the victim's age.1
6 6
An important innovation of the new law is the crime of violenza ses-
16716suale di gruppo, or group sexual assault. 68 This provision states that
when more than one person participates in acts of sexual violence as de-
fined in Article 609 bis, each offender is to be sentenced to six to twelve
years imprisonment. If any of the aggravating circumstances set out in
Article 609 ter are present, the punishment is to be increased by up to
one third.'6 ' By defining group sexual assault as a separate crime, the
legislature removed this situation from the general provisions on aggra-
vating circumstances in the context of complicity set out in Article 112
of the Criminal Code, to address specifically this increasing and alarm-
ing phenomenon.'
This specific attention to group rape and the appropriate sentence
to be imposed was, in large part, a public and legislative reaction to an
incident in March of 1988 described in the media as "the rape in Piazza
Navona. ' 1" A young woman was raped by three men in Rome's Piazza
162. C.p. art. 609 quarter.
163. C.P. art. 609 quarter paras. 3, 4.
164. C.P. art. 609 quarter.
165. C.p. art. 609 quinquies.
166. C.P. art. 609 sexies.
167. C.P. art. 609 octies.
168. Massimo Domini, Articolo 9 in COMMENTARIO DELLE "NoRME CONTRO LA
VIOLENZA SESSUALE" 291 (Alberto Cadoppi ed., 1999).
169. C.I. art. 64.
170. P. Ricci et. al., Violenza sessuale e risposta istituzionale: Considerazioni critiche sulla
nuova normativepenale in materia, 1996/pt. I LA GIUSTIZIA PENALE 366.
171. Eugenia Del Balzo, "Lo stupro di Piazza Navona" Le sentenze e alcune valutazioni,
1989/n.1 QUESTIONE GIUSTIZIA 119.
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Navona. The three were caught in the act, convicted and sentenced to
four years and four months. On appeal, the sentence was cut in half,
allowing the judge to grant them a suspended sentence. 172 Since the new
law raised the minimum sentence to six years, suspended sentences are
no longer possible for this offense.
173
In addition to these changes to the rape law, the 1996 reform in-
cludes provisions that are designed to protect the privacy of the victim.
For example, the 1996 law created the offense "concerning the protec-
tion of privacy," punishing anyone who divulges personal details or
images of a rape victim with a sentence of three to six months. 74 The
1996 law also added a provision to the Italian Code of Criminal Proce-
dure stating that although sexual assault trials are to be open to the
public, the victim may request that these trials be closed partially or
completely.175 This provision also states that all such trials are to be
closed when the victim is a minor.7 6 Finally, this provision specifies that
questions about the victim's private life or sexuality are not permitted
unless this is necessary for the reconstruction of the facts.
177
B. Prosecution Under the 1996Law
Article 609 septies sets out the situations in which prosecution of
rape is to be initiated by querela and when prosecution is to be auto-
matic. 178 As to simple or aggravated sexual assault, defined in Articles
609 bis and 609 ter, prosecution is by querela unless any of the following
facts are present: 1) the victim is less than fourteen years of age; 2) the
offender is a parent, including an adoptive parent of the victim, or co-
habitates with the minor victim; 3) the offender is a guardian of the
victim or is any other person to whom the minor has been entrusted for
purposes of education, instruction, treatment, supervision, or custody;
4) the offender is a public official or otherwise charged with public ser-
vice; or 5) the offense of sexual assault is connected to another offense as
to which prosecution is automatic. In all of these situations, prosecution
is d'ufficio, or automatic.79  Except for the fourth and fifth situations
172. Id.
173. BAssi, ET AL., VIOLENZA SESSUALE, supra note 112, at 64.
174. C.P. art. 734 bis.
175. C.P.P. art. 472 (3 bis).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. My explanation is based on an outline in Virgilio, supra note 101, at 330.
179. C.P. art. 609, bis; C.P. art. 609 ter.
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listed above, prosecution proceeds d'ufficio in order to protect minors
who are victims of sexual assault. 8°
As to atti sessuali con minorenne, or sexual acts with a minor, essen-
tially statutory rape, set out in Article 609 quater, prosecution proceeds
by querela unless: 1) the victim is less than ten years of age; 2) the victim
is less than sixteen years of age and the offender is an individual de-
scribed in Article 609 quater, paragraph 1, subpart 2, and set out above
in my translation of this provision, essentially one with some form of
authority over the minor; 3) if the victim is less than fourteen years of
age and the offender is a public official or one otherwise charged with
carrying out public duties; 4) if the victim is less than fourteen years of
age and the sexual offense is connected to another crime as to which
prosecution proceeds d'ufficio, or automatically. The offenses of group
sexual assault and corruption of a minor must be prosecuted d'ufficio; a
querela is not required.
Thus, where the victim is an adult and the offender is not a public
official, as set out in Article 609 septies, paragraph 4, subpart 3, group
sexual assault is not involved, and the sexual offense is not connected to
another offense requiring automatic prosecution, a rape prosecution
must be initiated by a querela, that is, the pubblico ministero cannot
prosecute the offender unless the victim declares that he or she wishes
the prosecution to go forward. Similar to the Zanardelli and Rocco
Codes, the 1996 law retains the querela requirement even in cases where
the sexual assault was committed with the use of force, coercion, or vio-
lence.
Article 609 septies also includes rules regarding the querela in cases
of rape that differ from some of the general provisions discussed in Part
II, above. One such difference is that the victim has six months, rather
than three under Article 124 of the Penal Code, in which to exercise the
right of querela.18' This exception to the three month limitation is the
only such exception under the Penal Code. 8 Some reformers argued for
an extension of up to two years of this time limitation.'83 The main ar-
gument was that the traumatic experience of rape makes it unlikely that
most victims will be in a position, emotionally speaking, to make a rea-
soned decision, within only three months, regarding prosecution.'
84
180. See Virgilio, supra note 101, at 330.
181. C.P. art. 609 bis, para. 2.
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The second significant divergence from the general provisions on
the querela is that once the victim of a sexual offense requiring a querela
fulfills this requirement it becomes irrevocable.185 As to all other offenses
prosecuted by querela it is possible to waive or withdraw the querela and
thus prevent prosecution. This provision continues the rule under the
1930 Rocco code that a querela alleging rape is irrevocable. The ration-
ale for not allowing victims to withdraw a querela is not entirely clear,
but it seems that the legislature was concerned that a rape victim who
exercises the right of querela might be pressured, by the offender, the
victim's family, or others, to withdraw or waive the querela.
Most reformers maintained that the querela would protect victim
agency. The next section explores the meaning of victim agency and
then explains why the compromise ultimately adopted does not achieve
this goal.
IV. VICTIM AGENCY
As discussed in the Introduction and in Part III, the primary ra-
tionale asserted for maintaining the querela requirement for sexual
assault was to ensure protection of the victim's agency, or self-
determination. This section describes the notion of victim agency, par-
ticularly as used by American legal scholars in the context of domestic
violence. This section then examines inconsistent aspects of the querela
requirement in the 1996 law and concludes that the drafters adopted a
definition of victim agency that is too simplistic and therefore insuffi-
cient to empower victims of sexual assault.
Agency, autonomy and self-determination have been used to de-
scribe a number of feminist goals. For example, women's emancipation
and "freedom from oppressive restrictions imposed by reason of sex" has
been defined to mean protection of women's right to self-determination
and individual autonomy; "free to decide one's own destiny, to define
one's social role.""' This goal focuses mainly on the elimination of barri-
ers to women making decisions about their lives. Another use of these
terms has been to recognize the "resistance, struggles, and achievements
of the oppressed." 187 This description of agency recognizes that subordi-
nated people cannot achieve full autonomy given their oppression;
185. C.P. art. 609 bis, para. 3.
186. Gerda Lerner, The Meaning of Seneca Falls, 1848-1998, 45 DISSENT 34, 39 (1998).
187. Martha Mahoney, Victimization or Oppression? Women " Lives, Violence, and Agency,
in THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE VIOLENCE: THE DISCOVERY OF DOMESTIC
ABUSE 54, 59 (Martha Fineman & Roxanne Mykitiuk eds., 1994).
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agency for them is "always partial, contingent, and emerging.' '188 Coker
and Mahoney highlight the dichotomous nature of the labels victimiza-
tion and agency: "you are an agent if you are not a victim, and you are a
victim if you are in no way an agent."'89 Abrams has described one di-
mension of agency as "self-direction."9 Broadly defined, this aspect of
agency focuses on "the ability to formulate goals and plans that are one's
own, as opposed to the products of the influence of others."'' This
definition is broad enough to include making decisions about what ca-
reer to pursue as well as developing strategies for leaving an abusive192
partner. Significantly, this definition recognizes and validates as exam-
ples of agency actions that women in battering relationships may take to
ensure the security of themselves and of their children."'
A large amount of legal scholarship in the United States focuses on
issues of agency and victimization in the context of mandatory policies
adopted to ensure effective responses to domestic violence."4 Such poli-
cies include requiring police to arrest the batterer, the "mandatory
arrest" policy, and requiring prosecutors to pursue prosecution of the
batterer even in situations where the victim opposes prosecution, the
"no-drop prosecution" policy."5 Certainly, such policies seek to ensure
that state actors take domestic violence seriously, an important goal for
feminist law reformers. Indeed, some commentators argue that manda-
tory arrest policies actually empower victims by removing the burden of
this decision from her and helping her to get out of the abusive relation-
ship.1 96 However, feminists are also concerned that these policies will
188. Donna Coker, Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic Violence Law: A
CriticalReview, 4 BUFF. CRiM. L. Rav. 801, 821 (2001).
189. Id. at 822 (quoting Mahoney, supra note 187, at 64.).
190. Kathryn Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency: Feminist Perspectives on Self-Direction, 40
WM. & MARY L. REv. 805, 824 (1999).
191. Id. at 829.
192. Id at 830, 834.
193. Id., at 824 (discussing Martha Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining
the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1991)).
194. See e.g., Erin L. Han, Mandatory Arrest and No-Drop Policies: Victim Empowerment in
Domestic Violence Cases, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 159 (2003); Christine
O'Connor, Note, Domestic Violence No-Contact Orders and the Autonomy Right of
Victims, 40 B.C. L. REV. 937 (1999).
195. Coker, supra note 188, at 806. See also Tonya McCormick, Convicting Domestic Vio-
lence Abusers When the Victim Remains Silent, 13 BYU J. PUB. L. 427, 437-46 (1999)
(discussing the specific strategies adopted by Utah County and Maryland for prose-
cuting domestic abusers without the testimony of the victim).
196. Barbara Fedders, Lobbying for Mandatory-Arrest Policies: Race, Class, and the Politics of
the Battered Women's Movement, 23 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 281, 290
(1997).
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result in state control of women who are victims of domestic violence.
Mills argues that mandatory policies can "reinforce a battered woman's
psychic injury and encourage feelings of guilt, low self-esteem, and de-
pendency" thus causing "the state to replicate unwittingly the behavior
of the batterer in some cases." '197 The challenge for feminist law reform-
ers has been to ensure that domestic violence is taken seriously by state
actors, while respecting the wishes and needs of the victim. An impor-
tant insight is that the meaning of agency is broader and more complex
than the narrow issue of whether the victim can decide whether her
abuser is to be arrested and prosecuted.19 That is, it is important to rec-
ognize and take account of how social norms influence individual choice
and of the barriers that exist to impede choice.
The development of "coordinated community intervention pro-
grams" is, at least in part, an attempt to examine and address the
obstacles to agency.,99 These programs seek to provide "essential services"
for battered women such as "emergency housing, legal advocacy, support
groups . . ., and financial resources. ' 20 ' Not only can these services pro-
tect battered women from greater danger and abuse, they can also
provide empowering support for battered women. This type of support
can enable a battered woman to leave her barterer and can address her
individual concerns that may make her reluctant to prosecute the bat-
terer.01 Thus, bringing together services and people outside the criminal
justice system can respect the agency of the victim as well as increase the
likelihood of successful prosecution of the batterer. In addition, an em-
phasis on educating police officers, prosecutors and judges has
accompanied this development.20 2 Victims of battering may be reluctant
to invoke the criminal justice system because they fear how police,
197. Linda G. Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State Interven-
tion, 113 HARv. L. REv. 550, 595 (1999).
198. Coker, supra note 188, at 823 ("[S]imple accounts of women's agency-'if a woman
wants to live in a violent relationship, it is her choice'-fail to account for the level of
coercion and restraint operating in battered women's lives.") (quoting Cheryl Hanna,
No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions,
109 HkRv. L. REv. 1849, 1874 (1996)).
199. Coker, supra note 188, at 845.
200. Id.
201. See Deborah Epstein, Redefining the State s Response to Domestic Violence: Past Victories
andFuture Challenges, 1 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 127 Summer 1999, at 127.
202. See Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the
Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 3 (1999)
(commending integrated domestic violence courts); Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of
Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 1970-1990, 83 J. CruM. LAw & CRIMINOLOGY 46,
52 (1992) (noting the problem of domestic abuse practiced by police).
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prosecutors and judges might treat them.2 ' Educational efforts seek to
provide information that dispels traditional myths about domestic vio-
lence and explains the dynamics involved in battering relationships, and
thus make it less likely that the victims of abuse will be abused by actors
in the criminal justice system. Recognition that the notion of agency is
complex has helped advocates for survivors of domestic violence address
a variety of concerns that may prevent women from pursuing criminal
prosecution.
V. VICTIM AGENCY AND THE QUERELA
Those who argued for retaining the querela in Italy applied a con-
ception of agency too simplistic to achieve the goal of protecting victim
agency in rape cases. While the 20 year debate over the reformed law
reflects concerns that the state should not force rape victims to pursue
prosecutions, reformers gave insufficient consideration to the obstacles
that rape victims may face in deciding whether to initiate a querela. Nor
did the reformers give adequate attention to the fact that throughout the
history of the querela in Italian criminal justice, this institution has
served as a barrier to rape prosecution. Thus, the symbolic importance
of retaining the querela may well eliminate any advances in protecting
victim agency. In addition, the final resolution of the issue of the querela
was a compromise and thus produced inconsistencies that do not fur-
ther even the simplistic notion of agency the reformers relied on.
The reform proposed by popular petition in 1979 emphasized the
importance of symbolic changes to rape law in Italy. Of particular
significance, as discussed above, was the categorization of rape as a crime
against the person. Italian commentators uniformly recognize that this
change was symbolic, but also went beyond mere symbolism because it
reflected a change in the law's attitude about rape and the harm
involved.2°4 Yet, those reformers who favored maintaining the querela to
protect victims from state coercion did not reflect on the symbolic
impact of maintaining an institution that has served, for over 200 years,
to silence victims of sexual violence. This device has been a way to
encourage arrangements like reparatory marriage.20 ' The reformers did
not take up the question of how to alter the negative reputation of the
203. Epstein, supra note 202.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 114-119.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 73-77.
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querela as a "false protection" for rape victims, and how to best
encourage victims to request criminal prosecution.
The argument that the querela will protect victims is met with ad-
ditional skepticism because there are numerous examples throughout
Italian history of legal reforms that seemed beneficial to women, yet
achieved no real or immediate change. For example, although the Italian
Civil Code of 1865 established that both husband and wife could exer-
cise patria potesta, or parental authority,0 6 the husband remained the
head of the household; the wife could not enter into contracts without
his consent, nor could she participate in consiglio difamiglia, or family
conferences where important decisions were made by the adult men of
the extended family.207 The 1948 Italian Civil Code proclaimed that
husband and wife have mutual obligations of cohabitation, fidelity and
assistance, yet it also established that "the husband is the head of the
family."
20 8
More generally, the Italian Constitution of 1948 declared that
"[A]l1 citizens have equal social dignity and are equal before the law,
without distinction of sex, race, language, religion, political opinion, or
personal and social condition. '20 9 The promise of equality remained un-
fulfilled until 1960.210 For twelve years constitutional provisions
specifying women's equality were considered mere aspirations rather
than immediately enforceable rights. The reasoning was that the equality
provisions expressed goals for the legislature to work toward rather than
actual rules in and of themselves that could be enforced right away.21' A
206. See DE FRANCHIS, supra note 10, at 1056 for a translation ofpatriapotesth.
207. BELLOMO, supra note 81, at 95 (asserting that the 1865 Italian Civil Code contained
many of the same limitations on wives as did Napoleon's Code). I have not located
an explanation of consiglio difamiglia. My translation is based on my inferences from
sources like BELLOMO and PAOLO UNGARI, STORIA DEL DIRITTO DI FAMIGLIA IN
ITALIA (1796-1975) (2d ed., 2002), as well as from conversations with Italian
women.
208. BELLOMO, supra note 81, at 132.
209. COST. (Italy) (Vincent A. Scanio & Manfred C. Vernon trans. 1948) thereinafter
Cost. (Italy)]. The Italian Constitution also includes provisions that specifically pro-
claim equality of the sexes. For example, one article states that "[tihe working woman
has the same rights on basis of equality of work to the same compensation which ap-
plies to the working man." Id. art. 37, para. 1. Another article provides that "[a]ll
citizens of either sex may hold public offices and elective positions ... Id. art. 51,
para. 1.
210. CORTE COST., May 18, 1960 reprinted in BELLOMO, supra note 81, at 177-79 (declar-
ing unconstitutional a portion of a 1919 law that excluded women from certain
public offices that required the exercise of political rights and authority).
211. BELLOMO, supra note 81, at 166 and 168 (discussing decision by the Consiglio di
Stato in 1954, holding that the equality provisions in the constitution simply set out
guidelines for future legislation).
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state institution did not rely on these provisions to strike discriminatory
legislation until after the Italian Constitutional Court was created in
1956.212 The history of the querela and the history of women's rights in
Italy make it unlikely that the querela requirement for rape might none-
theless become, by itself, a real protection for women.
Scholarship analyzing victim agency in the context of devising
strategies to tackle domestic violence reveals that victim agency is
broader and more complex than simplistic notions of "victim choice."
Certainly, the goal of protecting a rape victim's agency is important. As
Boon points out, "when individuals are forced to engage in sexual or
reproductive acts, their autonomy is circumscribed, their exercise of
agency is not realized, and their ability to safeguard their freedom of
choice and their physical integrity is compromised."2 "' Prosecution of
the rapist, which involves pretrial hearings, investigations, the trial itself,
and the publicity surrounding all of these proceedings, against the
wishes of the victim can further harm victim agency because, once
again, the victim has no control. Indeed a number of commentators
have asserted that prosecution of the rapist amounts to a second rape of
the victim."4 The state's prosecution of alleged rapists should take into
account how rape harms victim agency and should avoid exacerbating
this harm. However, simply delegating to the victim the decision of
whether to initiate prosecution of the alleged rapist does not attend to
the complexities of victim agency, nor does this solution examine and
attempt to address barriers to victim agency that rape victims may face.
An effort to protect victim agency would first inquire into why rape
victims are reluctant to initiate prosecution. Such an inquiry would
parallel that considered in the development of "coordinated community
intervention programs" designed to empower victims of domestic
212. Id. at 169. Although articles 134-137 of the 1948 Constitution provided for the
creation of a Constitutional Court, the Court was not created until 1956. Id.
213. Kristen Boon, Rape and Forced Pregnancy Under the ICC Statute: Human Dignity,
Autonomy, and Consent, 32 COLUM. HuM. RTs. L. Rav. 625, 642 (2001).
214. TASLITZ, supra, note 2, at 49 (describing how victims feel "twice raped"); see also
Coppi, supra note 3, at 18 (describing how Italian feminists have declared that the
"rape trial" results in further harm to the victim); Tom Lininger, Bearing the Cross, 74
FoRDiAM L. REv. 1353 (2005) (discussing the harm caused by cross-examination,
especially to victims of sexual assault and domestic violence, and explaining that it
was after she subjected to a mock cross-examination by a lawyer in the prosecutor's
office that the complainant in the Kobe Bryant case wanted to drop the charges);
Leonore M.J. Simon, Sex Offender Legislation and the Antitherapeutic Effects on Vic-
tims, 41 ARiz. L. REv. 485, 526 (1999)("[T]he legal system, in particular, further
traumatizes victims of child molestation and forcible rape who have a relationship
with the offender.").
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violence. 215 The 1996 law addresses a couple of possibilities. As
mentioned earlier, the new law makes it a misdemeanor to divulge the
identity or images of a rape victim. 21 6 The law also prohibits questions at
trial about the private life or sexual history of the victim, and allows the
victim an opportunity to request that the trial, or portions of it, be
closed to the public. 2 7 Victims who are concerned about protecting
their privacy may be reassured by such provisions. 2Is These provisions
might therefore support victim agency by avoiding a situation where the
victim is placed on trial. In addition, Italy has a relatively extensive
network of anti-violence centers and hotlines for victims of rape (telefoni
rosa).21 9 However, unlike the coordinated community intervention
programs, the Italian approach to protecting victim agency does not
include a program for eradicating biases and prejudices that can arise in
the criminal justice system as well as in society. Indeed, anti-violence
activists have emphasized that legal reforms will not be as effective as
they could be if "the attitudes or the ignorance of those charged with
implementing them" do not change.220 The following cases are examples
of how rape myths continue to influence judicial evaluations of whether
211the victim consented to sex acts.
In February 1998 the Third Section of the Italian Corte di Cassazi-
one, the court of last resort for criminal appeals, overturned a conviction
for rape on the grounds that a number of factors led the court to ques-
tion the credibility of the eighteen-year-old victim. 22 2 In particular, the
court noted that the victim was wearing jeans on the day that she had
215. See supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text.
216. C.P. art. 734 bis. Such criminal statutes are rare in the United States. See Marah de-
Meule, Note, Privacy Protections for the Rape Complainant: Haifa Fig Leaf 80 N.D.
L. REV. 145, 169 (2004)
217. C.P.P art. 472, para. 3 bis.
218. But see DE MEULE, supra note 216, at 173-74 (asserting that rape-shield laws are usu-
ally applied only to stranger rape cases and are, in any event, "insufficient to address
the privacy needs of rape complainants").
219. See VIRGILIO, supra note 158, at 189.
220. CLARE DALTON & ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND THE LAW
1097 (2001).
221. Despite educational efforts in the United States, actors in the justice system still make
disparaging comments." Seee.g. Robert Perez & Rene Stutzman, Judge's Insult Shocks
Rape Victim, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 29, 2004, at Al (reporting comment of Judge
Gene Stephenson when looking at photograph of rape victim who had been beaten
by her rapist: "Why would he want to rape her? She doesn't look like a day at the
beach."); see also Deborah M. Weissman, Gender-Based Violence as Judicial Anomaly:
Between "The Truly National and the Truly Local," 42 B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1092
nn.58-60 (2001) (describing additional examples of judicial bias against female vic-
tims of violence).
222. Cass., sez. tre, nov. 1998, Foro It. I 1999, CXII, 163.
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intercourse with the accused, her forty-five-year-old driving instructor,
stating that "it is a fact of common experience that it is nearly impossi-
ble to remove jeans on another person without the wearer's active
cooperation, after all [taking off jeans] is a difficult enough operation for
the one wearing them., 22' The court called the victim's accusations into
further doubt because there was no evidence that she resisted; indeed she
got into the car after the rape and drove with the accused back to her
home.224
More recently, the Corte di Cassazione quashed another rape convic-
tion on the grounds that the evidence was not sufficient to show that
the accused used violence or threats to accomplish the sexual acts, nor to
show that the victim did not consent. 225 The trial court and the Court of
Appeal both determined that the victim's testimony was credible because
she reported the assault within hours of its occurrence and there was
testimony that she appeared distraught and disturbed, to the point of
fainting, after the assault.226 In addition, both lower courts found that
the circumstances of the assault made it difficult for the victim to resist.
Specifically, the Court of Appeal pointed to the fact that the assault oc-
curred very suddenly and unexpectedly, and that the accused
immobilized the victim's legs and penetrated her anus with his hand and
performed oral sex on her.22' The Court of Appeal further determined
that the offense of sexual assault, as amended by the 1996 law, is to pro-
tect the sexual self-determination of the victim from the sexual instinct
of the accused, and this bene giuridico was harmed in the victim's en-
counter with the accused. 228 The Corte di Cassazione quashed the
223. Cass., sez. tre, nov. 1998, Foro It. 11 1999, CXXII, 163, 169 (translation by author);
see also Kitty Calavita, Blue Jeans, Rape, and the "De-Constitutive" Power of Law, 35
LAw & Soc'Y REv. 89, 94 (2001) (including further translation and discussion). For a
more detailed description of this case, in English, see Rachel A. Van Cleave, Sex, Lies,
and Honor in Italian Rape Law, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 427, 446-453 (2005).
224. Cass., sez. tre, nov. 1998, Foro It. 11 1999, CXII, 163, 169.
225. Cass., sez. tre, 4 feb. 2002, n. 3949 reprinted in L TEMI ROMANA-RASSEGNA DI
DOTMrINA E GIURISPRUDENZA 130 (May-Aug., 2001). For the opinion of Court of
Appeal in Rome affirming the conviction, see Corte app. di Roma, sez. tre., 12 July
2000, n. 6679, reprinted in L TEMI ROMANA-RASSEGNA DI DOTrRINA E
GIURISPRUDENZA 90-92 (Jan.-Apr., 2001).
226. Corte app. di Roma, sez. tre, 12 July 2000, n. 6679, reprinted in L TEMI ROMANA-
RASSEGNA DI DOTTRINA E GIURISPRUDENZA 90-92, 91 (Jan.- Apr., 2001).
227. Corte app. di Roma, sez. tre, 12 July 2000.
228. Despite the fact that the lower court convicted S.M. of sexual assault the court de-
termined that mitigating factors were present and sentenced S.M. to two years
confinement and suspended this reduced sentence. Id., at 90-91. See also VIRGILIO,
supra note 158, at 184-85 (discussing the broad discretion judges have under the
1996 law to reduce a defendant's sentence).
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conviction because the facts described by the Court of Appeal showed
that the victim's hands were not restrained while the accused performed
oral sex on her and that she admitted to having had an orgasm during
the encounter.229 The court concluded that these facts did not indicate
that the victim was "at the mercy" of the defendant and therefore she
could have attempted at least minimal resistance. 23 In addition, she
failed to manifest any objections to the defendant's actions during the
231twenty minute encounter.
These decisions illustrate that while some Italian judges are no
longer governed by biases and myths that have plagued rape law many
still are and find it difficult to believe a victim who did not physically
resist the assault or was not immobilized by the accused.232 Virgilio as-
serts that strengthening the ties between the local entities such as the
police, judges, and medical personnel and women's groups and the anti-
violence centers will provide better support for victims of violence and
lead to changes in how the law is applied.233 Certainly, this is promising.
Nonetheless, these were not issues addressed by those who favored
maintaining the querela requirement.
Finally, the internal inconsistencies in the 1996 law with respect to
the querela, as well as the differences between the querela for rape and
the querela for other offenses, indicate that the need for legislative com-
promise best explains the inclusion of the querela requirement. Most
significantly, once a sexual assault victim presents a querela she may not
revoke it.234 It makes little sense to say, on the one hand, rape is to be
prosecuted by querela to give the victim this choice, but then to limit
229. Corte app. di Roma, sez. tre, 12 July 2000.
230. Corte app. di Roma, sez. tre, 12 July 2000.
231. Cass. sez. tre, 4 feb. 2002, no. 3949, reprinted in L TEMI ROMANA-RASSEGNA DI
DOTTRINA E GIURISPRUDENZA 130 (May-Aug., 2001).
232. Additional facts described in a brief comment on the S.M. case reveal that S.M. and
the victim had been dating. Mariateresa Elena Povia, Problematica relative alla
valenza del dissenso nel reato di violenze sessuale, L TEMI ROMANA-RASSEGNA DI
DOTTRINA E GIURISPRUDENZA 92-94 (2001) (commenting on the Court of Appeal
decision and concluding that a victim must communicate her lack of consent to the
defendant). See also Luca Giordano and Mariateresa Elena Povio, Nota, L TEMI RO-
MANA-RASSEGNA DI DOTTRINA E GIURISPRUDENZA 130, 131 (May-Aug., 2001)
(commenting on the decision of the Corte di Cassazione and lamenting that the court
did not devote greater analysis to the meanings of "force" and "lack of consent" in the
context of sudden and unexpected assaults). Skepticism of a rape complainant who
did not physically resist dates back to the views of Enlightenment thinkers that the
"'consummated' rape must be a permitted rape." GEORGES VIGARELLO, A HISTORY
OF RAPE: SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN FRANCE FROM THE 16TH TO THE 20TH CENTURY 43
(Jean Birrell trans., 2001).
233. VIRGILIO, supra note 158, at 189 and 191.
234. See supra text accompanying note 185.
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the victim's choices by making the querela irrevocable. If pressure on the
victim is a real concern, it makes more sense to do away with the querela
requirement for rape altogether. After all, the victim could be subject to
the same pressures when deciding whether to present a querela to begin
with. The extension of the time for presenting a querela from three
months to six months paradoxically leaves the victim vulnerable to such
pressures for a longer period of time.25 The reasons for changing both of
these aspects of the querela for rape amount to paternalistic views of rape
victims. It is difficult to see how such paternalism is consistent with vic-
tim empowerment. Furthermore, setting up a separate querela system,
extending the time for presenting the querela and making it irrevocable,
solely for sexual offenses serves to preserve the "special" nature of these
offenses.236
Since the querela is one tool that the Italian legislature has relied on
to trim government's responsibility to prosecute less serious offenses,237
requiring the querela for rape adds to the perception that the state does
not take crimes of sexual violence seriously. An aspect of the 1996 law
that further contributes to this perception is the exception to the querela
requirement where the sexual assault was committed along with another
offense that is prosecuted d'ufficio.238 A similar exception existed in both
the Zanardelli and Rocco Codes.2 9 The following example illustrates the
effect of this exception. The Italian Penal Code defines robbery as taking
the property of another by means of violence or threats of violence.
Robbery is prosecuted d'ufficio 4' If a sexual assault that would other-
wise be prosecuted by querela is accompanied by a robbery, both the
robbery and the sexual assault are to be prosecuted automatically,
whether or not the victim wants prosecution to proceed. The justifica-
tion for this exception echoes those given for the same exception under
the prior penal codes; investigation of the robbery will likely bring to
235. VIRGILIO, supra note 71, at 115.
236. PITCH, supra note 6, at 161.
237. See supra text accompanying notes 19-33.
238. C.P. 609 septies para. 4(4).
239. The Zanardelli Code required prosecution d'ufficio if the rape was accompanied by
another offense punishable by at least thirty months imprisonment and which is
prosecuted d'ufficio. C.P. (1889) art. 336 The Rocco Code provided that rape was to
be prosecuted by querela unless "the act is related to another crime for which prosecu-
tion must be initiated automatically." C.P (1930) art. 542, para. 3(2).
240. C.P. art. 628.
241. 1 NUOVI QUATTRO CODICI : CIVILE E DI PROCEDURA CIVILE, PENALE E DI PROCEDURA
PENALE E LE LEGGI COMPELMENTARI 1053 (Francesco Bartolini et al. eds., 2003)
(including procedural notes following article 628 of the penal code, stating that
robbery is prosecuted d'ufficio).
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light evidence of the sexual assault, thus the goal of protecting the vic-
242tim's privacy can no longer be achieved. This reasoning does not
explain why the rape victim's agency is to be sacrificed in such scenarios.
Unfortunately, despite the repeated claims of Italian scholars and legisla-
tors that rape is a serious offense243 there is a real danger that this
exception sends the message that rape is not serious enough for the state
to assume the burden of automatic prosecution unless it is connected to
another crime that must be prosecuted automatically. Indeed, such a
message echoes that found in the history of rape in Italy.244 Nonetheless,
nonsexual but related facts such as "breaking and entering, abduction,
assault on the victim or relatives and neighbors, and theft ... gave the
crime [of rape] significance.,
245
It is difficult to understand how prosecution against the wishes of
the victim simply because the accused may have also ripped jewelry
from the victim's neck protects the agency of the rape victim.
CONCLUSION
One Italian commentator argues that the querela is the only means
of protecting the victim and should be retained until the criminal justice
system develops effective alternatives. 246 However, this approach adheres
to an unduly narrow definition of victim agency that focuses solely on
victim control over the decision to prosecute and avoids the difficult
inquiry into why rape victims may be reluctant to formally request
criminal prosecution. While some promising steps have been made to
create support mechanisms for victims of sexual violence, there remains
a striking void of systematic efforts to destroy persistent rape myths held
by individuals who work in criminal justice. Endeavors to educate po-
242. See Tiziana Jurincich, Delitti sessuali ed estinzione del reato connesso: una nuova
pronuncia della Corte Costituzionale 10 GIURISPRUDENZA ITALIANA 1895 (1998)
(reproducing and commenting on decision n.64 of the Italian Constitutional Court
issued on March 17, 1998. The court relied on this reasoning to support the d'ufficio
prosecution of the sexual assault even though the robbery charge had been quashed).
243. See VIRGILIO, supra note 71, at 100 (stating that the argument that prosecution by
querela minimizes the seriousness of sexual offenses is simply not convincing, and cit-
ing others who are in agreement).
244. GUIDO RUGGIERO, THE BOUNDARIES OF EROS: SEX CRIME AND SEXUALITY IN REN-
AISSANCE VENICE 96 (1985) (concluding that in Renaissance Venice rape was a minor
offense).
245. Id. Ruggiero notes that while rape in such situations was considered more serious, the
effect was that "these ancillary misdeeds were consistently underpenalized in the con-
text of rape").
246. GIUNTA, supra note 36, at 73.
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lice, prosecutors, defense attorneys and judges are crucial to creating a
criminal process that does not subject a victim to a "second rape." In
addition, the internal inconsistencies created by the 1996 law with re-
spect to the querela requirement resulted in not only a narrow definition
of victim agency, but also in a subordination of the goal of agency to
paternalistic concerns completely at odds with notions of empower-
ment. The 1996 law gives the victim the decision of whether to
prosecute the sexual assault, but does not allow her an opportunity to
change her mind if she decides to go forward. Furthermore, the 1996
law takes away the victim's ability to make this choice where the sexual
assault is connected to another offense requiring automatic prosecution.
More importantly, preserving the querela ignores the silencing effect
this device has had on rape victims throughout its history. It is a mystery
how the 1996 law can transform an institution that has only harmed
victims of sexual violence into one that plays a central role in protecting
such victims.
One solution that would have reversed the issue of victim choice
was proposed, but ultimately rejected.247 This proposal would have re-
quired prosecution d'ufficio, but when there is a lack of an express
manifestation of the victim's wish to proceed, the prosecutor must notify
the victim of her right to oppose prosecution.248
Another possibility would be to examine the issue of victim choice
outside the context of sexual assault and instead consider this more
broadly within the Italian criminal justice system. Before 1989 when
Italy dramatically altered its criminal justice system, state control of
criminal prosecutions was the rule, and victim involvement in this deci-
sion the exception, reflecting hierarchical notions of state authority.
Important aspects of the 1989 reform of the Italian Code of Criminal
Procedure created mechanisms through which the defendant and the
prosecutor can agree to disposition of criminal charges without recourse
to a full trial.24 ' Despite these changes, the 1989 Code included proce-
dures for implementing the querela similar to those under the prior
247. The so-called "Bassanini-Gramaglia amendment" was proposed in February, 1989.
VIRGIL1O, supra note 71, at 102.
248. This amendment would not have given effect to opposition by the victim if the vic-
tim is under the age of fourteen or the accused is the parent of the victim, or is a
public official. Id. at 102-103 (reproducing the amendment).
249. See Maximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization
of Plea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 HARv.
INT'L L.J. 1, 46-54 (2004); Pizzi and Marafioti, supra note 17; Van Cleave, supra
note 17.
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code.250 Yet, the new code did not consider on a more global level the
role of the victim and the extent to which the victim's wishes as to
prosecution should influence the initiation of criminal proceedings as to
all offenses. Deliberation on the role of the victim generally may result
in a new procedural device that is founded on specific principles, in con-
trast to the variety of purposes served by the querela.
Nonetheless, even a procedural device that reflects a broader evalua-
tion of the role of the victim will not succeed in protecting the agency of
rape victims if the biases of players in the justice system are not eradi-
cated, and if other barriers to the victim's choice are not addressed. t
250. C.P.P. 336-41.
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